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Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology, edited
by Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne, and Dani Rabinowitz. Oxford
University Press, 2018. Pp. x + 345. $74.00 (hardcover).
ANDREW MOON, Virginia Commonwealth University
This book is comprised of sixteen new essays in religious epistemology
and is divided into four parts with four chapters each: “Part I: Historical,”
“Part II: Formal,” “Part III: Social,” and “Part IV: Rational.” The papers
are very good, and the book delivers what its title advertises: lots of new
insights in religious epistemology. I recommend it to anyone who wishes
to dig into cutting-edge religious epistemology. Most of the papers are
suitable for the graduate level or higher.
With sixteen papers, I risk saying nothing of substance about any one
of them by trying to say something substantive about all of them. So, I
will devote more time to certain papers. However, my saying little about a
paper should imply nothing about my view of its quality and more about
my own areas of specialty and ability to say something interesting about
it. Readers can also turn to the editors’ introductory chapter for synopses
of each chapter.
Part I opens with Charity Anderson’s paper, “Hume, Defeat, and Miracle Reports.” Like many, I am familiar with Hume’s argument against
miracles. But I hadn’t made clear the connections between his argument
and concepts in recent epistemology. This is what Anderson does. She
provides a careful discussion of Hume’s argument by drawing from recent literature on testimony, formal epistemology, epistemic defeat, and
knowledge-first. Her ability to bring all these topics to bear on Hume’s
argument is impressive. Part I also includes papers by Richard Cross on
Aquinas’s and Scotus’s religious epistemologies, Billy Dunaway on Duns
Scotus and Henry of Ghent’s debate about the necessity of divine illumination for knowledge (with an interesting discussion of the safety condition),
and Dani Rabinowitz on repentance in historic Jewish philosophy (with
applications of Williamsonian epistemology).
Part II is more technical, with three papers applied to the fine-tuning
argument. However, I think the main points in all the papers can be
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followed, even if one cannot follow the most difficult parts. Roger White
explores whether an infinite universe (with infinite and diverse religious
believers) creates a bigger problem of religious diversity than the regular
problem of religious diversity we observe here on Earth; after taking the
reader on a philosophical journey, White concludes, “No.”
Isaac Choi explains how one person could know more than another
person, despite their both having an infinite number of beliefs. He then
applies his explanation to the so-called “normalizability problem” for the
fine-tuning argument. Of note is Choi’s rejection of Cantor’s principle of
correspondence for infinite sets. (This will surprise some, given its seeming orthodoxy, but Choi shows how this rejection can solve a lot of problems and is not without precedent among mathematicians.)
John Hawthorne and Yoaav Isaac’s paper illustrates the power of
Bayesian epistemology. By formulating the fine-tuning argument using
Bayesian tools, we see both a forceful fine-tuning argument and also how
misguided and weak many of its prominent objections are. It was fun to
see them swat away objection after objection. Also, the three appendices of
their paper should not be ignored since they break a lot of ground.
Lastly, Hans Halvorson presents a challenge for the fine-tuning argument. Although some parts of his paper are more technical, the main argument is built around the insight that we should take into account not
only the low probability that the universe would be fine-tuned, but the
low probability that God would make the universe in need of fine-tuning.
Part III includes three papers on testimony and one on the nature of
faith. I have the most to say about Max Baker-Hytch’s paper, so I will save
that for later in this review. Rachel Fraser draws from philosophy of language and distinguishes two theories according to which a testifier can
fail to transmit belief to a testifiee: 1) the testifiee might lack requisite emotional capacities or 2) the testifiee might lack causal contact with the object
that the testimony is about. Both theories, if true, would explain why some
hearers of religious testimony might fail to gain religious belief by way of
that testimony.
Jennifer Lackey distinguishes between two models of expert testimony:
the expert-as-authority (where an expert’s testimony replaces all other reasons the subject has) and the expert-as-advisor (where an expert’s testimony
is evidence that is to be weighed with the other evidence the subject has).
She argues that we should reject the former (along with Linda Zagzebski’s
argument for it) and replace it with the latter. This has implications for how
we view religious experts.
Paulina Sliwa’s paper is on the nature of faith. Just as we can understand
the moral virtue of kindness in terms of acts of kindness (and knowing how
to perform kind acts), she argues that we can understand faith in terms
of acts of faith (and knowing how to perform acts of faith). Sliwa marshals
many interesting thought experiments to support her view, applies her
account to religious faith, responds to objections, criticizes Lara Buchak’s

BOOK REVIEWS

131

account of faith, and ends with reflections on how her account applies to
religious practice and Pascal’s wager.
Part IV includes one paper about the epistemology of modality and
three papers on the justification or warrant of religious belief. Margot
Strohminger and Juhani Yli-Vakkuri criticize Peter van Inwagen’s argument for skepticism about the metaphysical modality that underwrites
premises of certain arguments in philosophy of religion. However, they
then defend a Williamson-based modal epistemology that still casts significant doubt on those same arguments.
Matthew Benton discusses the “Old Pascalian Problem” (the traditional
Pascal’s wager), as well as the “New Pascalian Problem,” which arises
from the relationship between pragmatic encroachment—the view that
practical concerns can directly affect whether one knows—and religious
epistemology. Much of the discussion revolves around the striking claim
that it is harder to know that atheism is true than it is to know that theism
is true because of the practical costs of believing the former and the practical benefits of believing the latter.
Swinburne defends a version of phenomenal conservatism—the view
that an appearance that p provides prima facie justification for believing p.
Using his characteristically methodical style, Swinburne carefully defines
his terms and then places phenomenal conservatism within a Bayesian
framework. An implication of Swinburne’s discussion for religious epistemology is that a seeming that God is present can justify believing theism,
but a seeming that God is not present does not justify believing atheism.
He writes, “an experience which is not an experience of [God’s] presence
. . . is no greater evidence of his non-existence, than having an experience
which is not an experience of a unicorn is evidence that there are no unicorns anywhere in the universe” (337).
I will now delve more deeply into the papers by Keith DeRose and Max
Baker-Hytch. In “Delusions of Knowledge Concerning God’s Existence,”
DeRose seeks to “express, explain, and to some extent defend my suspicion that hardly anyone, if anyone at all, knows whether God exists” (288).
On his view, beliefs that God exists, even if true, don’t amount to knowledge. (In other words, they lack warrant, the property which turns true belief into knowledge.) DeRose’s paper is partly autobiographical and reads
like an honest and open-minded investigation. I enjoyed it and was led to
reconsider whether my own theistic belief is warranted.
First, DeRose notes that religious experience is likely the best candidate for producing knowledge that God exists. (Philosophical argument,
he thinks, is insufficient.) Second, he argues at length that the religious
experiences people actually have will not do the job. For example, his own
religious experiences are not sufficient for his theistic belief to be warranted (294). He then notes that people who used to take themselves to
know, but then later de-converted, will think that their prior religious experiences were not so strong after all, and that “there was some element
of insincerity, lack of genuineness, or even phoniness, in the certainty they

132

Faith and Philosophy

had earlier projected to the world” (295). He’s skeptical of people’s present
self-ascriptions of knowledge because he’s seen enough de-converters later
give negative evaluations of their prior self-ascriptions of knowledge (296).
Here is an objection to the content of DeRose’s suspicion. Surely, if God
exists, at least someone knows that God exists: God. And if one of the major
monotheistic world religions is true, then some major prophets will likely
know that God exists. If Islam is true, no doubt, Muhammed knew that
God exists. If Judaism is true, then Abraham and Moses no doubt knew
that God exists. If Christianity is true, then Jesus, Peter, Paul, Mary, and
other members of the early church knew that God exists. So, we should
only think that nobody knows God exists if Christianity (and Islam and
Judaism) are false.
Now, perhaps DeRose meant to restrict his claim to humans who are
alive today. Maybe Moses knew that God exists, but what about you and
me? I’ll suggest a way by which we could know that God exists, but I’ll be
in a better place to do that after my discussion of Baker-Hytch’s paper, to
which I now turn.
Baker-Hytch’s “Testimony amidst Diversity” was my favorite paper in
the volume. I have the most to say about it, perhaps because it most overlaps with my own research. He first notes that many religious beliefs are
based primarily on testimony. He then investigates whether such beliefs
are unreliably formed (even if they are true). He examines three ways to
interpret “reliability”—as sensitivity, safety, and statistical reliability—and
argues that testimony-based religious beliefs could have all three of these
epistemic goods. It follows that if certain religious beliefs are true, then
they probably are reliably formed. (Very roughly, S’s belief that p is sensitive
if and only if if p were false, then S wouldn’t believe p. S’s belief that p is
safe if and only if S couldn’t easily have falsely believed p [or propositions
similar to p]; S’s belief that p is statistically reliable if and only if S’s belief
is produced by a statistically reliable process. More precise, but lengthier,
definitions are on 185.)
At this point, it will be useful to place Baker-Hytch’s paper in the larger
dialectical context of the religious epistemology literature. This will help
us to appreciate both the predecessors of some of its ideas and also the
ways in which Baker-Hytch breaks new ground. In Warranted Christian
Belief (Oxford University Press, 2000), Alvin Plantinga famously argued
that if Christian belief is true, then it is probably warranted. Plantinga
drew attention to his now well-known view that the warrant of Christian
belief depends on its truth. In Plantinga’s terminology, the de jure (positive
epistemic status) question about Christian belief depends on the de facto
(truth) question. If Christian belief is true, Plantinga argues, then the Holy
Spirit is likely to be involved in the formation of many Christian beliefs.
And if that is so, Plantinga argues, then such Christian beliefs are likely to
meet his proper functionalist conditions on warrant.
We can see that by arguing that certain religious beliefs would be reliably formed if those beliefs were true, Baker-Hytch is drawing from
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Plantinga’s useful (and now seemingly obvious) point that de jure questions about religious belief can depend on de facto questions. We can also
see that Baker-Hytch breaks ground in at least two ways. First, since he is
not wedded to a proper functionalist theory of warrant, he can instead ask
whether religious belief, if true, is likely to have other positive epistemic
properties than those mentioned in Plantinga’s proper functionalist theory,
such as safety, sensitivity, and statistical reliability. This is important since
many epistemologists are interested in these properties and also think
they are necessary for warrant. Second, Baker-Hytch explores whether
those forming their religious beliefs by way of ordinary human testimony
would have these positive epistemic properties; he doesn’t imagine them
forming their beliefs by way of the direct testimony of the Holy Spirit or
some other divine method. So, we see how Baker-Hytch owes some of the
framing of his discussion to Plantinga’s but also moves beyond it.
The main reason Baker-Hytch considers for thinking that religious belief is unreliably formed, if based on human testimony, is that such testimony-based processes produce beliefs in a great number of contradictory
religious systems. In reply, Baker-Hytch carefully argues that many religious beliefs—especially monotheistic ones—would be sensitive, safe, and
formed by statistically reliable processes (if true). He imagines Jane, who
believes Christianity primarily on the basis of her parents’ testimony and
the Bible (185–186). Baker-Hytch notes that, given Christianity’s truth, it is
likely that the beginning of the testimonial chains that resulted in Jane’s
Christian beliefs was God’s activity in the early church. He then carefully
argues that this makes it probable that Jane’s Christian belief would be
sensitive, safe, and statistically reliable. In the process, Baker-Hytch again
breaks new ground. For example, when exploring sensitivity, he examines both impossible as well as possible worlds; when exploring safety,
he is sensitive to the various bases one might hold fixed when examining
nearby worlds; when assessing statistical reliability, he is sensitive to work
on the generality problem. His effort, to me, was convincing.
Baker-Hytch then argues that the testimony-based religious believer
can avoid defeat that comes from awareness of religious diversity. A monotheistic religious believer, like Jane, could have a good argument that her
belief is likely to be reliably formed if true. The reason is that if there is an
“extremely powerful, knowledgeable, and morally good deity,” then it is
likely that that such a being would have “ensured the reliable testimonial
dissemination of the core tenets” of that religion (196). Nontheistic religions would have no deity playing that role. Jane would thereby have a
symmetry breaker between herself and believers in nontheistic religions.
Lastly, despite all the nice things Baker-Hytch says about a testimonybased believer like Jane, he reveals a downside: Jane could not have reflective knowledge of her religious beliefs, i.e., she can’t know that she knows.
He writes,
[W]hile there is good reason to think that the truth of any one of the major
monotheisms makes it overwhelmingly likely that God acted specially in
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order to bring about revelatory events at the beginnings of the relevant testimony chains, it is far from clear that the truth of any of these belief-systems
makes it especially likely that God would engage in special promptings intended to result in second-order beliefs (199).

Even if Jane’s Christian belief is reliably formed, Baker-Hytch argues, she
would still have no reason to think that her belief is reliably formed.
Now to discussion. I’ll first make a point about the scope of the believers to which Baker-Hytch’s argument will apply. If Christianity is true,
then, as Plantinga argues, a great many Christian beliefs are not formed by
ordinary human testimony. Rather, the Holy Spirit’s own testimony and
instigation will be involved in Christian belief formation. Now, this point
is minor since Baker-Hytch’s argument is still worth considering for those
Christian and nonChristian religious believers who do only believe by way
of ordinary human testimony. Plantinga’s view tells us nothing about the
warrant-status of Christian beliefs that were not directly instigated by the
Holy Spirit. And even if the Holy Spirit is at work in the formation of every
Christian belief, it’s still worth exploring what the warrant-status of Christian belief would be if the Holy Spirit weren’t so active and was instead
only directly active at the beginning of the testimonial chain.
My second point is an objection. I challenge Baker-Hytch’s claim that
Jane has no reason to think that her belief is reliably formed, even if it
is based on human testimony. Baker-Hytch takes himself to have argued
that < if Christian belief is true, then it is probably reliably formed >. There
is nothing that prevents Jane from being apprised of Baker-Hytch’s argument for this conditional. Suppose also that Jane’s belief that < Christianity is true > is reliably formed (as is supposed in Baker-Hytch’s scenario).
Then Jane can perform a simple modus ponens inference and conclude that
her Christian belief is probably reliably formed. So, Jane can have good
reason to think her belief is reliably formed; hence, it seems that reflective knowledge is open to her. So, I agree with nearly all of Baker-Hytch’s
claims, but I don’t agree with the one that claims that Jane couldn’t have
reflective knowledge.
Lastly, let us return to DeRose’s paper. Plausibly, if Christianity is true,
then the apostles knew God exists. Many Christians today, like Jane, are
directly linked by testimony to some of those apostolic knowers; the testimonial chain is only one link long in the case of Jane reading her Bible, and
it is a bit longer in the case of Jane hearing from her parents. Furthermore,
if Baker-Hytch’s arguments are correct, then Jane’s Christian belief is probably safe, sensitive, and reliably formed. The combination of these properties, along with its testimonial origin, provides a good case for thinking
Jane’s Christian belief is warranted, and hence, that she knows God exists.
So, even if DeRose is correct that religious experience (and philosophical
argument) is not enough for theistic knowledge, Baker-Hytch’s argument
suggests that ordinary testimony is enough.

